When Macedonia’s further integration into Nato was vetoed by Greece in March 2008, it was clear that this was to be yet another episode in the notorious name dispute between the two countries. This dispute has been ongoing since Macedonia’s declaration of independence in 1991 and culminated in a Greek embargo on Macedonia in 1994. The countries realised the dangerousness of the situation and signed an interim agreement in 1995 in order to prevent a further conflict in the region. Greece agreed to support Macedonia’s integration into international organisations under the acronym FYROM (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), while Macedonia agreed to desist from using its constitutional name in international fora. That Greece has nevertheless blocked Macedonia’s accession may be interpreted as a breach of the interim agreement and Macedonia has already filed a case against Greece in this respect in front of the International Court of Justice.
More important and more interesting is the question of why Greece is still vehemently opposing Macedonia’s use of its constitutional name. The official justification is that Greece wants to protect itself from Macedonian irredentism and wants to prevent Macedonians from adopting an identity that many Greeks perceive as their own. While these arguments are usually received with some understanding, most foreign spectators will find it hard to believe and ultimately unconvincing, that these should be the reasons for a year-long dispute that is holding back and threatening the security of the entire region.
And indeed there is more to it than Greece likes to admit. It is the argument about Macedonian irredentism that strikes close to the core of the dispute. What is at stake for Greece is not its territorial integrity but the integrity of the Greek nation and the doctrine of the inexistence of foreign minorities on Greek soil. Greece has never recognised more than the existence of a “slavophone” minority in its northern regions. A maturing Macedonian nation north of the border may however lead to a strengthened sense of identity for Macedonians south of the border. This is also why the incumbent Greek government has extended its demands beyond the name of the country. What is now at stake is the name of the Macedonian language and the name of its nation – issues relating to the very identity of every ethnic Macedonian.
Greece is aware that a western-integrated Republic of Macedonia that is no longer dependent on Greece’s support and no longer prone to a Greek veto may be more outspoken in defending the rights of ethnic Macedonians in Greece.
Also, the Greek insistence on the inexistence of an ethnic Macedonian minority in the province of Macedonia in northern Greece is an attempt to cover up the region’s multicultural – and for a long time predominantly Slavonic – heritage. The expulsion and persecution of ethnic Macedonians following the Greek civil war is one of the darker chapters of the country’s history. While the expulsion itself may have been an immediate reaction to the alignment of many ethnic Macedonians with the defeated socialist side, the subsequent complete denial of the issue by the majority of Greek politicians remains a disgrace. Few tragedies in history have attracted less interest than the expulsion of ethnic Macedonians from northern Greece. And yet, few tragedies have political repercussions that are as obvious and as relevant for the current political situation of the region.
Viewed against this background it is remarkable that the Greek behaviour has attracted no or very little protest. Not only has there been no public outcry about or concern with the fate of a vulnerable nation but also, and more significantly, Macedonia has received no political backing from the vast majority of western nations. Despite the fact that Greece has elevated a bilateral dispute to block Macedonia’s accession to a multilateral treaty, so far only the United States have clearly expressed their support. European nations on the other hand seem to accept Greece’s dictate of power over justice.
The Greek position in the name dispute infringes on the rights of ethnic Macedonians in Greece and on the rights of the people of the Republic of Macedonia to choose the name of their nation. It goes without saying that such a stance is unworthy of a western liberal democracy. But it also harms Greece’s image in the world. The newly-elected Greek government now has the chance to bid farewell to the notion of an ethnically pure nation state and to accept the existence of foreign minorities on its territory – something other European nations have long done. It lies in their hands to take this necessary step. Once it becomes clear to Greeks that this step is a necessity, both countries can work towards a meaningful compromise that will allow Greece and Macedonia to catch up on the good neighbourly relations that the business communities of both countries have long established. Maybe then, the region will finally move on from the ethno-nationalist ghosts of its past, to become a part of Europe, and worthy of its name.
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on Tuesday, October 27th, 2009 at 11:49 and is filed under Comment.
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What’s in a name?
by Alexander Kamp on 27 Oct 2009 in Comment
When Macedonia’s further integration into Nato was vetoed by Greece in March 2008, it was clear that this was to be yet another episode in the notorious name dispute between the two countries. This dispute has been ongoing since Macedonia’s declaration of independence in 1991 and culminated in a Greek embargo on Macedonia in 1994. The countries realised the dangerousness of the situation and signed an interim agreement in 1995 in order to prevent a further conflict in the region. Greece agreed to support Macedonia’s integration into international organisations under the acronym FYROM (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), while Macedonia agreed to desist from using its constitutional name in international fora. That Greece has nevertheless blocked Macedonia’s accession may be interpreted as a breach of the interim agreement and Macedonia has already filed a case against Greece in this respect in front of the International Court of Justice.
More important and more interesting is the question of why Greece is still vehemently opposing Macedonia’s use of its constitutional name. The official justification is that Greece wants to protect itself from Macedonian irredentism and wants to prevent Macedonians from adopting an identity that many Greeks perceive as their own. While these arguments are usually received with some understanding, most foreign spectators will find it hard to believe and ultimately unconvincing, that these should be the reasons for a year-long dispute that is holding back and threatening the security of the entire region.
And indeed there is more to it than Greece likes to admit. It is the argument about Macedonian irredentism that strikes close to the core of the dispute. What is at stake for Greece is not its territorial integrity but the integrity of the Greek nation and the doctrine of the inexistence of foreign minorities on Greek soil. Greece has never recognised more than the existence of a “slavophone” minority in its northern regions. A maturing Macedonian nation north of the border may however lead to a strengthened sense of identity for Macedonians south of the border. This is also why the incumbent Greek government has extended its demands beyond the name of the country. What is now at stake is the name of the Macedonian language and the name of its nation – issues relating to the very identity of every ethnic Macedonian.
Greece is aware that a western-integrated Republic of Macedonia that is no longer dependent on Greece’s support and no longer prone to a Greek veto may be more outspoken in defending the rights of ethnic Macedonians in Greece.
Also, the Greek insistence on the inexistence of an ethnic Macedonian minority in the province of Macedonia in northern Greece is an attempt to cover up the region’s multicultural – and for a long time predominantly Slavonic – heritage. The expulsion and persecution of ethnic Macedonians following the Greek civil war is one of the darker chapters of the country’s history. While the expulsion itself may have been an immediate reaction to the alignment of many ethnic Macedonians with the defeated socialist side, the subsequent complete denial of the issue by the majority of Greek politicians remains a disgrace. Few tragedies in history have attracted less interest than the expulsion of ethnic Macedonians from northern Greece. And yet, few tragedies have political repercussions that are as obvious and as relevant for the current political situation of the region.
Viewed against this background it is remarkable that the Greek behaviour has attracted no or very little protest. Not only has there been no public outcry about or concern with the fate of a vulnerable nation but also, and more significantly, Macedonia has received no political backing from the vast majority of western nations. Despite the fact that Greece has elevated a bilateral dispute to block Macedonia’s accession to a multilateral treaty, so far only the United States have clearly expressed their support. European nations on the other hand seem to accept Greece’s dictate of power over justice.
The Greek position in the name dispute infringes on the rights of ethnic Macedonians in Greece and on the rights of the people of the Republic of Macedonia to choose the name of their nation. It goes without saying that such a stance is unworthy of a western liberal democracy. But it also harms Greece’s image in the world. The newly-elected Greek government now has the chance to bid farewell to the notion of an ethnically pure nation state and to accept the existence of foreign minorities on its territory – something other European nations have long done. It lies in their hands to take this necessary step. Once it becomes clear to Greeks that this step is a necessity, both countries can work towards a meaningful compromise that will allow Greece and Macedonia to catch up on the good neighbourly relations that the business communities of both countries have long established. Maybe then, the region will finally move on from the ethno-nationalist ghosts of its past, to become a part of Europe, and worthy of its name.
No related posts.
This entry was posted on Tuesday, October 27th, 2009 at 11:49 and is filed under Comment. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. You can leave a response, or trackback from your own site.