Luke Cooper
November 13, 2007
And so it happened. On Saturday 3rd November after a year of political strife General Pervez Musharraf declared a state of emergency. On that afternoon the military moved to shut down all private television channels and began patrols on the streets of Islamabad. Military personnel occupied the Supreme Court and the Chief Justice. The terms of the state of emergency were clear and unequivocal. The constitution was to be suspended and a “provisional constitutional order” (PCO) passed all power in to the hands of Musharraf. In the absence of any constitutional rights or liberties, it gave a free reign to the military, police and governments agencies to crush any opposition to their rule – martial law in all but name.
On the surface the streets of Lahore have bustled in just the same manner as they did in the days before this move. There is, as yet, no curfew, nor does the army yet patrol the streets. But under the surface a feeling of fear and trepidation prevails. Talk to any Pakistani and the subject quickly moves on to the “emergency”. If you were a western tourist in Pakistan, although few come these days, the only visible sign of the new situation would be the large congregations of police officers on the street corners. But for the country’s political opposition the state of emergency has been keenly felt. It is hard to say exactly how many arrests there have been, but from reports of the opposition parties and the lawyers’ movement a figure of 10,000, perhaps more, is no exaggeration.
In heroic scenes at the Lahore High Court yesterday over 2,000 lawyers launched what was planned to be three days of action in protest at the state of emergency. As they took their protest from the High Court grounds onto the streets, they unceremoniously ejected the undercover police officers that had swamped the courts that morning. Fighting broke out as the police stopped the march from leaving the court. Many lawyers were determined to fight and showered the police with stones. In the initial scenes ,one older man was so badly beaten by police that he collapsed unconscious with blood pouring from a head wound. Three hours of pitched battles ensued in a courageous stand. The police eventually cleared out the court house leaving only the bitter stench of tear gas.
For the second day of protest the police had already occupied the court house and proceeded to arrest the lawyers that had returned for a second day of protest. In Lahore alone, 1,000 lawyers have been put behind bars. Similar scenes were reported in every town in Pakistan. The legal system has been effectively shut down here. Indeed, the aim of the coup ,for Musharraf, is the crushing of his opponents in the judiciary and the mass movement they have inspired.
In March ,Musharraf suspended the Chief Justice Chaudhaury on trumped up charges. The protests against his suspension were organised at first by lawyers, but drew in many ordinary people, even Pakistan’s slow moving and conservative opposition parties. At its high point in May, armed clashes took place between the movement and Musharraf supporters, crippling the whole country.
Musharraf: Loss of Control and Power
The Chief Justice was reinstated by the Supreme Court in July, and at the time Musharraf accepted their verdict. The Supreme Court was due to rule this week on whether Musharraf’s re-appointment for another five year term, by bodies last elected in 2002 (in allegedly rigged elections), was constitutional. It seems likely that Musharraf had it on good authority that they would rule against him and so made his move. In fact, all his manoeuvers this year regarding the judiciary have been done with one objective: to retain his personal power and that of the military. With his new powers under the PCO Musharraf has placed the dissenting judges under house arrest. Their last act had been to declare the PCO illegal.
In his address to the nation late on Saturday night, Musharraf emphasised an altogether different motivation. While he made passing mention to the “disloyal” and “disruptive” elements in the judiciary, he argued it was the growing jihadist insurgency that demanded he centralise power completely into his own hands. In his “message to his friends in the west” he went out of his way to emphasise this factor. America has, after all, funded Pakistan’s treasury to the tune of millions of dollars in aid and loan credits since 2001 – on the condition that Pakistan carries out a “war on terror” against Islamic forces in the country. .
In the major conflicts, the Pakistani army has waged, they have been defeated. Moreover, Pakistan’s military has a long history of funding and supporting jihadist militants, stretching back to the role it played in developing these forces to fight the Afghan-Soviet war in the 1980s. To ask them to wage war on these groups is to ask them to break with a central pillar of their domestic political support. Sure enough though, when under tremendous pressure from democratic forces Musharraf did move to crush the militant jihadist forces stationed at the Red Mosque in Islamabad this summer. His motivation was political expediency. He hoped to prove his pro-western, modern credentials while also splitting the forces who have opposed him, notably the pro-western Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). Since the Red Mosque massacre Pakistan has been beset by waves of terrorist violence carried out by Islamic extremists, which have not just targeted the military but also ordinary people. In the Afghan border regions, Pakistani forces, fighting a reactionary war, have suffered enormous casualties, with a thousand soldiers dying in just two and a half months. This defeat has forced the government into another ceasefire, which it signed just last week.
Taking Advantage of Repression
While the military campaign may have proved disastrous, the PPP, cheered on by Washington, have gone out of their way to secure the position of General Musharraf. In October they agreed to a power sharing deal with him that meant they did not oppose his presidential re-appointment. This was done on the condition that he resign his position in the army, drop corruption charges against PPP leaders, and amend the constitution to allow PPP chairperson Benazir Bhutto to stand a third term as prime minister. The move by Musharraf to a state of emergency and the crushing of opposition exposes the hopeless character of these compromises – if, that is, the PPP ever aimed for a real democratic change.
The PPP, like all Pakistan’s major opposition parties, is fraught with corruption. The Bhutto family is part of Pakistan’s tiny landowning elite, and the party has a history of patronage in government. Bhutto initially came out to condemn Musharraf’s “second coup”, but on Tuesday she announced the deal with Musharraf was still possible. She is said to be going to Islamabad for talks with the general. The suspension of the constitution actually opens the door to her taking a third term as prime minister, which would otherwise be unconstitutional.
Musharraf’s second coup was in many ways a tacit admission that he had lost control of the country in the face of demands for democratic demands, rising workers’ struggles and serious defeats for the military in the Afghan border regions. In this fast moving political situation it is impossible to predict what will happen. What we can be sure of is that Pakistan has much more political instability and turbulence ahead. So far, Pakistan’s slow moving and conservative main opposition forces have left the lawyers’ movement to fight alone against the state of emergency. While fear and uncertainty currently rule amongst the masses, there can be no doubt that they detest Musharraf more than ever, and would respond decisively to a call for strike action by the large opposition parties. There is also the big question of what kind of government replaces the military junta. Amongst many ordinary people I talk to, democratic change is not actually at the top of their priorities. The democratic governments of the 1990s were just as corrupt and inefficient as the current regime.
In this spirit, the case of Pakistan illustrates the systemic crisis in world politics. None of the major Pakistani opposition parties propose a fundamental break with the US relationship and the hugely destructive “war on terror” and neoliberal economic programme that come with it. The continuation of these policies will only deepen the catastrophic, indeed revolutionary, proportions of Pakistan’s crisis. In such times, great opportunities and great dangers co-exist.
Luke Cooper will be giving an eyewitness report at the LSE Revolution Society launch meeting at 1700 Wednesday 14th November, Room K105. He will also be speaking on Pakistan at the “90 Years of Revolution” event in Leeds. For details of the minibus to this event from London contact Jo on 07748044216.